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NOTES & COMMENTS
The Unlikely Duo That Shocked the
Intellectual Property World and Why the
Supreme Court Was the Chosen One to
Restore Balance
NICHOLAS DILTS*
The United States Congress passed the Leahy Smith
America Invents Act in 2011 in an effort to streamline the
patent system and reduce patent litigation, allowing the
United States to continue to be competitive globally. The Act
enabled the U.S. Patent Office to facilitate patent challenges
through an administrative process called inter partes review, an adversarial proceeding before the newly established Patent Trial and Appeal Board that was designed to
be a cheaper and more efficient alternative for post-grant
patent review than litigation in front of the federal district
courts. In the years that followed, the Patent Trail and Appeal Board has earned a reputation for being notoriously
trigger-happy in its invalidation of patents. This reputation
*
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has encouraged patent holders to seek out ways to circumvent inter partes review in an effort to have their patents reviewed in front of the federal district courts, where they
might stand a better chance. One such attempt was initiated
by the global pharmaceutical company, Allergan, Inc., when
it sold the rights to its Restasis eye drug to the Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe. The main components of the deal focused on
a transfer of the Restasis ownership rights along with a
yearly sum to the Tribe. In return, the Tribe licensed back
the drug’s production rights to Allergan and agreed to assert
a tribal sovereign immunity defense in response to any inter
partes review challenge, which would force the dispute into
the federal district court forum.
The Allergan-Saint Regis deal threatened to have major
impacts on the intellectual property world, the livelihoods of
the federally recognized tribes, and the U.S. economy overall. The issues it presented involved an intersection of multiple types of law and begged a review of the patent review
process, the state of the tribes today, and the scope of tribal
sovereign immunity in today’s day and age. Whether tribal
sovereign immunity could be applied to an administrative
action in post-grant patent review evolved into a battle at
multiple forums. When the dust settled, the Patent Trial and
Review Board had issued a decision that tribal sovereign immunity was not applicable and invalidated the Restasis patent—a decision that was affirmed by the United States
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the United
States. This Comment discusses all of the angles in this case
before advocating that the Supreme Court ultimately did not
go far enough when it simply chose not to review the lower
court’s decision. Instead, the Court should have used this
opportunity to limit tribal sovereign immunity in a way that
implies a waiver of sovereign immunity for economic activities that take place off of tribal lands. This solution would
simultaneously help to promote overall systemic and economic efficiency, as well as allow the tribes a better opportunity to participate in today’s marketplaces—providing
them with a more positive outlook for the future.
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INTRODUCTION
In September of 2017, the pharmaceutical company Allergan, a
leader in the industry, announced a deal that transferred the patent
rights to one of their most valuable drugs, Restasis, to the Saint
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Regis Mohawk Tribe.1 Under the major terms of the deal, Allergan
transferred the patent rights and $13.75 million to the Tribe, who
agreed to grant an exclusive license of those same rights back to
Allergan for $15 million a year in royalty payments throughout the
patent’s lifespan.2 While this transaction looked like a very bad business deal on its face, the move created instant buzz within the legal
community because of its potential impact on the future of the intellectual property world, the rest of the federally recognized tribes,
and virtually all consumers within the United States.3 So, why did
Allergan choose to partner with a Native American tribe and why
has the move garnered such attention? Because Allergan, with the
assistance of the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, was in pursuit of a major pharmaceutical company’s Holy Grail—immunity from review
by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s patent review process.4
Prior to the deal, the validity of Allergan’s patent rights to their
Restasis eye drugs had been challenged by several generic competitors looking to market their own, cheaper version of the drug.5 Normally, the U.S. Patent Office facilitates such challenges through an
administrative process called inter partes review (“IPR”) that entails
an adversarial proceeding before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(“PTAB” or “Board”) rather than litigation before the federal district
courts of the United States.6 While the IPR process was designed to
be a cheaper and more efficient alternative for reviewing the validity
of patents, it has drawn the ire of drug companies like Allergan that
often find themselves before the Board as defendants.7 This is due
to the companies’ shared belief that presenting their patents for review in front of the Board is the intellectual property world’s equivalent of sending their patent to the gallows.8 However, unlike its
1

Katie Thomas, How to Protect a Drug Patent? Give It to a Native American Tribe, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/
health/allergan-patent-tribe.html.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Joe Mullin, Apple Is Being Sued for Patent Infringement by a Native American Tribe, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 27, 2017, 8:11 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/09/apple-is-being-sued-for-patent-infringement-by-anative-american-tribe/.
7
Id.
8
See infra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
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predecessors that lost their patents following a PTAB review, Allergan strategically crafted a plan to bypass the Board’s review, which
began when the company ceded ownership of the Restasis patent to
the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe.
As the new owners, Saint Regis asserted a tribal sovereign immunity defense in front of the PTAB in an effort to shield the patent
from the Board’s review.9 If such a defense were allowed, the PTAB
would have been left without the jurisdiction required to render a
decision on the patent’s validity.10 For Allergan, the deal would have
enabled the company to defend their patent in a more agreeable forum—the federal district courts. For the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
and the rest of the Native American tribes within the United States,
the move provided a potential revenue stream and accompanying
opportunities for a community that is in deep need.11 For the rest of
us, the ramifications of this deal and the extent of its potential effect
on the U.S. economy were incalculable. The battle over Restasis
evolved into one fought on multiple fronts, both in front of the
PTAB and the federal courts.12 In February of 2018, the PTAB rendered a decision against Saint Regis’s use of the tribal sovereign
immunity defense, saying that it did not apply in this case. 13 The
Tribe appealed that decision, which was affirmed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.14 Allergan and the
Tribe petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a review
of the decision, but the Court denied their writ of certiorari, affirming the lower court’s decision and putting an end to the case.15

9

Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2016-01127, Paper 130, at 2 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018); Thomas, supra note 1; Jason Rantanen,
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Allergan v. Mylan: No Tribal Immunity for IPR, PATENTLY-O (July 23, 2018) https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/07/mohawk-allergan-immunity.html.
10
Thomas, supra note 1.
11
Id.
12
Rantanen, supra note 9.
13
Id.
14
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2018); Rantanen, supra note 9.
15
Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Allergan Bid to Use Tribe
to Shield Drug Patents, REUTERS (Apr. 15, 2019, 9:41 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-allergan/us-supreme-court-rejects-allergan-bid-touse-tribe-to-shield-drug-patents-idUSKCN1RR1FD.
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The issue of whether tribal immunity from suit can be applied to
an administrative action in patent review begs a review of the scope
of tribal immunity, the effectiveness of the IPR process, and consideration of the impact a decision for either side will have going forward. This Comment argues that the correct course of action in this
situation was to not only invalidate the Allergan-Saint Regis deal,
but also amend the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity as a
whole—a task that could have been accomplished by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Part I provides background information
on IPR, tribal sovereign immunity, and the state of the tribes today
in an effort to better understand the Allergan-Saint Regis deal. Part
II analyzes the major issues posed by the Allergan-Saint Regis case
and why the PTAB should not have ruled on the matter. Finally, Part
III argues that the Supreme Court should have invalidated the deal
and, in doing so, amended the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity
to imply a waiver of its protections for tribal commercial activities
that occur off of the reservation.
I. BACKGROUND
A dive into the intricate and complex matters surrounding this
issue warrants an overview of the background and legal positions
that shaped the driving factors behind the Allergan-Saint Regis
deal—current patent law, tribal sovereign immunity, and the state of
Native American tribes in our country today.
A. Patent Law and IPR
The Constitution of the United States grants the federal government the power to create and issue patents.16 The owner of a patent
can prevent all others from making, selling, or using their invention
in the United States throughout the patent’s lifespan, which is generally twenty years from the date the inventor filed his or her patent
application.17 The limits that define the areas protected by a patent
are described in the patent’s claims.18 In order to obtain a patent, an

16

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
18
How Do I Read a Patent? - the Claims, BROWN & MICHAELS,
http://www.bpmlegal.com/howtopat5.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
17
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applicant must prove that their invention is both novel19 and nonobvious, meaning that the difference between the prior art and the
claimed invention would not be obvious to a “person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.”20 From
a policy standpoint, the U.S. patent system is functioning at its most
optimal level when there is a balance between patent holders and
market competition.21 Allowing patent holders to have a monopoly
over their invention for the duration of their patent incentivizes research and development that likely would not occur absent such protections, and thus, promotes innovation.22 On the other side of the
scale, “[c]ompetition stimulates innovation by fulfilling consumers’
unmet needs or providing them new, better services.”23
In 2011, Congress passed the Leahy Smith America Invents Act
(“AIA”), establishing the PTAB.24 The AIA gave the PTAB the ability to hold trials to challenge the validity of patents through several
new post-grant proceedings, including the IPR.25 Congress’s purpose when it created the IPR was to present a method for challenging
the validity of a patent that was a faster, cheaper alternative to litigation in the district courts.26 To accomplish this goal, IPRs were
designed as an adjudicative model (instead of examinational) that
includes restricted discovery, statutory time limits, litigation time
limits, and one level of appeal.27 Additionally, the post-grant review
of patents better enables the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

19

35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)–(2).
Id. § 103.
21
Stephanie A. Diehl, Treating the Disease: A First Amendment Remedy for
the Problem of Patent Trolls and Overbroad Business Methods, 33 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 495, 499 (2015).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Kenneth J. Costa, Patent System Manipulation: Hedge Funds Abusing IPR,
Poor Patent Quality & Pharmaceutical Monopolies, 35 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 177, 182 (2016).
25
Id.
26
Stacy Lewis & Tom Irving, Very Few Appreciated Just How Bad AIA Inter
Partes Reviews (IPRs) Would Be for Patent Owners, Although IPR Denials Have
Been, for Patent Owners, a Glimmer of Hope, 11 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 28, 31
(2015).
27
Id. at 32–33.
20
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(“PTO”) to weed out invalid or poor-quality patents while strengthening and validating the good patents that emerge from review unscathed.28
Early returns on the IPR process have sparked controversy and
earned the PTAB a nickname, the “Death Squad,” for its role in invalidating numerous existing patents.29 Kenneth Costa presented
several statistics that show just how beneficial the IPR process has
been for petitioners:
In its first year of IPR, the PTAB granted 87% of petitions, and in its second year, it granted 76% of petitions. The overall claim cancellation rate, as of
March 2014, was 96.4%. Thirty months into the creation of IPR, the overall claim cancellation rate was
80.9%.30
Numbers like these encourage generic drug companies and other
third parties to challenge name-brand pharmaceutical corporations
in front of the Board. In the eyes of many, pharmaceutical companies allegedly obtained these bad patents through abuse or manipulation of the patent approval process, part of a multitude of tactics
employed by big pharma that allow the companies to artificially increase drug prices and keep competitors out of the market.31
On the other hand, numbers such as these encouraged patent
holders to advocate that IPR is unfairly skewed to favor petitioners
and unnecessary because an avenue to challenge patents already exists at the federal courts.32 Opponents of this viewpoint argue that
IPRs are fundamentally different from district court proceedings in
28

157 CONG. REC. S1380 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Grass-

ley).
29

Rob Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death Squads: Are All Commercially
Viable Patents Invalid?, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/03/24/ptab-death-squads-are-all-commercially-viable-patents-invalid/id=48642/.
30
Costa, supra note 24, at 183.
31
Id. at 184–86 (discussing pharmaceutical companies’ ability to extend their
patents through simple changes to the dosage, packaging, or slightly reformulating the drug to produce a “new” version and describing “pay-for-delay” schemes
that pay generic drug companies to keep their generic version out of the market
or buy a start-up rival).
32
Thomas, supra note 1.
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ways that are favorable to the petitioners.33 The main differences are
identified as the “Big 3”: (1) the PTAB applies a “broadest reasonable interpretation” claim construction,34 while district courts use
the “ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by a
person of ordinary skill in the art” framework developed in Phillips
v. AWH Co.;35 (2) the PTAB grants no presumption of validity for
issued patent claims unlike the district court; and (3) the PTAB only
requires a showing of unpatentability by preponderance of the evidence, which is a lower standard than the “clear and convincing evidence” standard used by the district courts.36 Additionally, the
PTAB is not bound by other administrative proceedings or judicial
decisions, which means that an owner of a patent that a district court
ruled was valid can later find themselves defending their patent’s
validity again in an IPR proceeding.37
With the deck stacked against them in IPR, patent holders certainly have an incentive to force any fight over the validity of their
patents into the federal district courts where a patent’s chances to
survive are more favorable. Brent Saunders, the CEO of Allergan,
explained that the motivation behind the deal with the Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe was “to avoid what he described as the ‘double jeopardy’ of having the same issue heard in two venues.”38 In fact, the
legal theory behind the Allergan-Saint Regis deal and the parties’
attempt to block the PTAB’s ability to review the Restasis patent via
employment of the tribal sovereign immunity defense was motivated by recent PTAB decisions to dismiss cases based on the victorious party’s state sovereignty protections prescribed to them under the Eleventh Amendment.39
33

See Lewis & Irving, supra note 26, at 58–59.
Id.
35
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F. 3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
36
Lewis & Irving, supra note 26, at 58–59.
37
Id. at 60–61; see Katharine L. Neville, PTAB Not Always Bound by Previous Court Decisions Regarding Patent Validity, MARSHALL GERSTEIN IP:
PTABWATCH (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.ptabwatch.com/2017/12/ptab-not-always-bound-by-previous-court-decisions-regarding-patent-validity/ (explaining
that it is legally permissible for the PTAB to arrive at different conclusions regarding patentability than an earlier court decision on the same patent due to differing standards of review and/or additional evidence presented).
38
Thomas, supra note 1.
39
See id.
34
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B. Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Exploring the history of tribal sovereign immunity helps answer
the complex questions posed by the Allergan-Saint Regis deal and
presents the justification for the Supreme Court’s authority to alter
the doctrine. The first and only mention of the Native American
tribes within the United States Constitution lies within the Indian
Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the power to regulate
commerce with the tribes.40 In the past, courts consistently interpreted this as a grant to Congress of plenary and exclusive authority
to legislate in regard to tribal affairs.41 This reading is supported by
the repeatedly relied upon characterization of Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations”42 whose title as sovereigns stems from
their status as self-governing nations that pre-existed the United
States and its Constitution.43 However, unlike state sovereign immunity from suit, which is codified in the Eleventh Amendment,44
the Supreme Court independently created tribal immunity from suit
as federal common law in United States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty
Company when it held that “Indian Nations are exempt from suit
without congressional authorization.”45 The purpose of this immunity was grounded in “history” and the principle of comity, defined
as a “proper respect for tribal sovereignty,” that encourages harmonious relations between the United States and tribal governments.46
The federal courts’ freedom to create common law can only be
prescribed through an explicit or implicit grant from the Constitution or Congress.47 While neither the Constitution nor Congress
have explicitly regulated tribal sovereign immunity, Thomas P.
McLish asserted that an implicit analysis of both led to the notion
that the policies embodied within statutes Congress has passed that
related to tribal affairs must serve as the basis for the federal court’s
40

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).
42
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); Okla. Tax
Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991).
43
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
44
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
45
309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940).
46
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2045 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
47
Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 883, 895–96 (1986).
41
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extension of tribal immunity from suit.48 An examination of those
statutes yielded McLish’s conclusion that the current congressional
policy “seeks to encourage tribal cultural autonomy, self-determination and economic security.”49 These policies present a framework
for identifying the scope of tribal immunity that will be used in this
Comment to assess the Allergan-Saint Regis deal.
Another useful guide for evaluating tribal sovereign immunity is
past jurisprudence on the doctrine. In the past, courts accepted that
any intent to abrogate tribal immunity must be unequivocally expressed by Congress. 50 Outside of that, only a clear waiver of sovereign immunity by a tribe would suffice and that waiver may not
be implied.51 The Supreme Court has emphasized stare decisis as
controlling and that, outside of congressional action, any departure
from the doctrine would demand “special justification.”52 This reasoning has stood despite recent limitations on the overall doctrine of
tribal sovereignty and a trend toward eliminating the other common
law immunities from suit.53 Lately, the Court has declined to make
an exception for commercial activities, even those occurring off
tribal reservations, in the face of contentions that tribal business ventures have become so detached from tribal interests that immunity
no longer makes sense in the commercial context.54 Throughout

48

See Thomas P. McLish, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Searching for Sensible
Limits, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 173, 181–89 (1988).
49
Id. at 184–89.
50
See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla.,
498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991) (“Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign
immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation.”).
51
Id.
52
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2037 (2014).
53
See, e.g., In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1058,
1064–68 (1982) (describing several recent court decisions concerning assertions
of tribal power over nonmembers and State taxation of tribal businesses located
on the reservation as evidence of a narrowing of tribal sovereignty).
54
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754–56
(1998) (tribe entitled to immunity from suit on promissory note regardless of
whether it was signed on or off the reservation); Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2034
(“[A] State lacks the ability to sue a tribe for illegal gaming when that activity
occurs off the reservation.”); Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 511 (tribal convenience
store operating on land not formally designated as “on reservation” exempt from
state cigarette tax); Puyallup Tribe, Inc., v. Dep’t of Game of the State of Wash.,
433 U.S. 165, 170–73 (1977) (state could not exercise jurisdiction over Tribe to
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these decisions, the Court has held that even in their own view of
the merits, the courts will “defer to the role Congress may wish to
exercise in this important judgment.”55
Despite this apparent steadfastness, judicial support for the doctrine of tribal immunity has begun to waiver. In Puyallup Tribe, Inc.
v. Department of Game of Washington, Justice Blackmun stated in
his concurring opinion that the doctrine “may well merit re-examination in an appropriate case.”56 Additionally, in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., the majority opinion
acknowledged the merits behind “doubt[ing] the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine.”57 In the recently decided Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Community, tribal sovereign immunity narrowly emerged
unscathed after four justices voted to curb the doctrine.58 As a part
of that decision, Justice Thomas wrote a powerful dissent that advocated for Kiowa’s overruling on the basis that the policy rationales
for the immunity doctrine and deference to Congress do not apply
to Kiowa’s “unjustifiable rule and its mounting consequences.”59
Thomas’s reasoning in his dissent helped form the basis of this
Comment’s ultimate resolution in Part III that the Court should have
amended tribal sovereign immunity to alleviate the problems the
doctrine now poses for modern society.
C. Native American Tribes Today
Any discussion of tribal sovereign immunity and the AllerganSaint Regis deal should consider the current economic position of
Native American tribes in the United States today. In light of the
congressional policy to promote tribal economic self-sufficiency,
“tribal business operations are critical . . . because such enterprises
in some cases ‘may be the only means by which a tribe can raise
revenues.’”60 On its face, the economy of American Indian tribes
seems to be doing well, especially in the gambling industry where
assess penalties related to regulation of their fishing activities on or off the reservation).
55
Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758.
56
Puyallup, 433 U.S. at 178–179 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (entertaining
doubts of the doctrine’s “continuing vitality”).
57
Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758.
58
See Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2024.
59
Id. at 2045–56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
60
Id. at 2043 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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gaming revenues have increased from $8.5 billion in 1998 to $27.9
billion in 2012.61 Outside of the gambling industry, tribes have engaged in on-reservation commercial activities like “tourism, recreation, mining, forestry and agriculture” as well as expanded off-reservation to domestic and international ventures including cigarettes,
foreign financing, national banks, cement plants, ski resorts, and hotels.62
Still, a look behind the curtain will reveal that the economic position of tribes is not what one might envision, especially when it
comes to gaming revenue from casinos.63 Only forty-two percent
(42%) of the federally recognized Native American tribes in the
United States operate gambling enterprises.64 Of those facilities
tribes are operating, twenty percent (20%) of them are raking in seventy percent (70%) of the total gaming revenues.65 This casts a
shadow over the popular idea that all American Indian tribes are lining their coffers with casino riches and reveals the darker reality—
a few tribes are profiting from gaming while many tribal governments struggle to find ways to bring in revenue for their constituents.
These efforts have been complicated by federal laws and court decisions that have served to limit tribal sovereign immunity and
broaden government jurisdiction over tribal reservations.66 The Supreme Court has allowed states to impose taxes on cigarette sales to
non-Indians,67 non-Indian businesses, 68 and property owned by nonIndians69 that are on Native American lands and normally would act
61

Id. at 2050 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2050–51.
63
See Gregory Ablavsky, Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Patent Law, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Sept. 13, 2017, 12:42 AM), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2017/09/tribal-sovereign-immunity-and-patent-law.html (stating that,
contrary to popular belief, “Indian gaming revenue is spread very unevenly, with
only a handful of well-situated tribes bringing in large sums”).
64
Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2043 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
65
Id.
66
See In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, supra note 53, at 1062–68
(describing what the author deems as “the demise of tribal immunity” based on
legislative and judicial actions that limited tribal sovereign immunity).
67
See generally, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152–54 (1980).
68
See Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., Inc., 526 U.S. 32, 36–39
(1999).
69
See generally, Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 281–84 (1898).
62
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as a revenue source for tribal governments. The effects have been
further compounded by congressional acts such as the Dawes Act,
which resulted in almost 150 million acres of American Indian reservation lands to be owned by non-Indians in an effort to encourage
tribal assimilation within American society.70
As a result of these legal developments, tribal leaders face a
tough choice—either subject individuals and businesses that choose
to settle on reservation lands to double taxation or limit their tribe’s
own ability to generate revenue.71 These funds could be used to assist constituencies that are in desperate need because Native Americans are still feeling the effects of hundreds of years of colonialization, violence, and persecution.72 In the third quarter of 2014, the
unemployment rate among Native Americans sat at 11%, which was
about twice the national average of 6.2%.73 Over one in four Native
Americans lived in poverty at the time and their labor force participation rate (a statistic that measures the percentage of adults that are
either working or looking for a job) was 61.6%—the lowest for all
race and minority groups.74 From an educational standpoint, 52% of
the 14,217 Native American students that took the ACT in 2013
failed to meet any of the college readiness benchmarks in the exam’s
four core subjects.75
All of these factors likely contribute to the heightened level of
criminal activity amongst American Indian peoples identified in a
study conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice between the
years of 1992 and 2002.76 According to the study, the rate of violent
victimization per 1,000 persons age twelve or older amongst American Indians was over twice the rate of any other race within the
70

Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2044 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Ablavsky, supra note 63.
72
See id.
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Katharine Peralta, Native Americans Left Behind in the Economic Recovery, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 27, 2014, 7:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/11/27/native-americans-left-behind-in-the-economic-recovery.
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Id.
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United States.77 Further, as offenders, American Indians had an arrest rate for alcohol violations that was twice the national rate, were
investigated and convicted for a higher rate of violent crimes than
all other races, and experienced an influx of gang activity within
Indian communities.78
In light of these circumstances, it is not difficult to ascertain
why the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe and others like it, in an effort to
overcome their economic and social disadvantages, might want to
engage in this type of transaction with Allergan. The Saint Regis
Tribe planned to use the revenues generated from Allergan’s royalty
payments and potential resulting deals with other companies to invest in the Tribe’s “many unmet needs.”79 Other than Allergan, the
Tribe has taken ownership of a technology company’s patents that
it expects will earn a significant amount of money through pursuit
of infringement suits in federal court.80 Saint Regis’s tactic had already begun to gain traction within the tribal community, as MEC
Resources, a company owned by the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arkikara
Nation, (otherwise known as the Three Affiliated Tribes) became a
plaintiff in an infringement suit against Apple for a recently purchased patent that the company claims Apple’s iPad 4 infringes
upon.81 Similar to Saint Regis, MEC Resources claimed sovereign
immunity to avoid IPR by the U.S. Patent Office and sued Apple in
federal court seeking royalty payments generated from the iPad’s
sales.82 This additional action provides just a small illustration of the
importance the PTAB and lawmakers’ responses to Allergan’s attempt to house its patents within the protective confines of tribal
sovereign immunity has on both the intellectual property world and
the broader American economy.83
II. ANALYSIS OF THE ALLERGAN-SAINT REGIS CASE
This Comment analyzes the two main points of contention in the
case against Allergan and the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe today. The
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id. at 4.
Id. at 17–21.
Thomas, supra note 1.
Mullin, supra note 6.
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See Thomas, supra note 1.
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first, whether or not Saint Regis’s sovereign immunity defense can
apply to IPR, is the threshold question that must be answered because it can bar the PTAB from taking any action concerning the
Restasis patent. Even if it were held that tribal sovereign immunity
from suit does apply, the Allergan-Saint Regis deal could be voided
if a court were to hold that the deal was a sham transaction. However, this Comment asserts that, because of the potential far-reaching ramifications that can result from a decision on this issue and the
limited design of IPR, the PTAB was not the appropriate forum for
adjudication on this matter. Instead, the Board should have refrained
from deciding the case and deferred to the federal courts for guidance. At the federal level, the courts could have issued a proper ruling that would have had uniform application across the law to prevent schemes of the Allergan-Saint Regis deal’s ilk in the future.
Additionally, such a ruling would have allowed the Supreme Court
of the United States the opportunity to address the growing problem
created by tribal sovereign immunity’s breadth.
A. The Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe Should Be Entitled to Assert a
Sovereign Immunity Defense to the Institution of an
IPR of Its Patent
The Supreme Court of the United States regards Native American tribes’ immunity from suit as one of the core aspects of sovereignty that a tribe possesses.84 In the past, the Court repeatedly dismissed any suit against a tribe that was without either an express
authorization from Congress or an express waiver from the tribe.85
The Court has also declined to make any exception to this tribal immunity notion for suits that arise from any of a tribe’s commercial
activities—even those that take place off of tribal lands.86
1. THE PTAB SHOULD HAVE VIEWED THIS CASE IN THE SCOPE OF
ITS PRIOR STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
DEFENSE DECISIONS AGAINST IPR
The issues presented in this case compare to prior PTAB decisions that addressed the applicability of state sovereign immunity
84

Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014).
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754
(1998).
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defenses in IPR proceedings. As an initial aside, a distinction between state and tribal sovereign immunity includes the fact that state
sovereign immunity from suit is codified in the Eleventh Amendment and tribal sovereign immunity finds its roots in federal common law.87 While these doctrinal differences make the PTAB decisions regarding state immunity non-binding, that should not disprove their relevance to the issue at hand. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly characterized Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations” in its decisions because, like the States, the tribes are separate
governments located within the country and subject to the control of
Congress. 88 In fact, the Supreme Court has accepted past arguments
that tribal immunity from suit is in some senses more powerful than
the States’ immunities because the Native American tribes were not
a party to the Constitutional Convention where each state surrendered their immunities from state-initiated suits.89
The Supreme Court strengthened state sovereign immunity from
suit in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports
Authority (FMC) when it held that the immunity’s protections extend to certain adjudicatory proceedings conducted before federal
agencies.90 According to the Court, the central purpose of a State’s
sovereign immunity is to give states the respect they are owed as
joint sovereigns.91 Similarly, the comity justification was the reasoning the Court attributed to its development of the tribal sovereignty doctrine.92 Following FMC, the PTAB applied the Court’s
holding in its decisions to dismiss challenges against state institutions in IPR proceedings.93
While Saint Regis’s use of a tribal sovereign immunity defense
against IPR was uncharted territory for decision makers on the
87

See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
See cases cited supra notes 41–43.
89
See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991).
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Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Port Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002).
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respect owed them as’ joint sovereigns.”).
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See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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See generally Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No.
IPR2016-1274, Paper 21 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017); Neochord, Inc. v. Univ. of
Md., No. IPR2016-208, Paper 28 (P.T.A.B. May 23, 2017); Reactive Surfaces
Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-1914, Paper 36 (P.T.A.B. July 13,
2017).
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Board, the PTAB’s past decisions in Covidien LP v. University of
Florida Research Foundation, Inc.,94 Neochord, Inc. v. University
of Maryland,95 and Reactive Surfaces Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Corp.96
presented an instructive framework the Board could have used in
deciding the case. Instead, the Board chose to differentiate between
the two types of sovereignty when it held that tribal immunity did
not apply to IPR.97 First, the Board referenced the Supreme Court’s
dicta in Kiowa that “the immunity possessed by Indian Tribes is not
co-extensive with that of the States.”98 Despite Saint Regis’s attempts to apply the holding of FMC to the proceeding, the Board
found that the Tribe had not presented any federal court or Board
precedent to suggest that FMC should be applied to assertions of
tribal sovereign immunity in similar federal administrative proceedings.99 The Board further discussed tribal sovereignty’s subjectivity
to Congress’s plenary control and the applicability of general Acts
of Congress—such as the Patent Act and the IPR proceedings included within its scope—to American Indians.100 Finally, the Board
stated that because it claimed personal jurisdiction over only the
challenged patents and not the patent owners themselves, the Board
was outside the reach of the protections granted by tribal sovereign
immunity.101
While the Board presented fair points when it explained the reasoning behind its decision, its logic does not exactly hold water. For
94
Covidien, No. IPR2016-1274, Paper 21, at 17–27 (applying FMC framework and finding that, considering the nature of IPR and the Board rules and procedures governing the review process, IPR resembled civil litigation sufficiently
enough to find that Eleventh Amendment immunity barred IPR against an unconsenting state).
95
Neochord, No. IPR2016-208, Paper 28, at 12 (finding that the University
could raise an Eleventh Amendment immunity defense in an IPR proceeding and
granting University’s motion to dismiss, terminating the review).
96
Reactive Surfaces, No. IPR2016-1914, Paper 36, at 6–11 (relying on the
factors identified in FMC and dismissing Regents of the University of Minnesota
from the action).
97
See generally Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No.
IPR2016-01127, Paper 130, at 11–18 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018).
98
Id. at 9 (quoting Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S.
751, 756 (1998)).
99
Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127, Paper 130, at 8.
100
Id. at 11.
101
Id. at 16–17.
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instance, the Board could have used the same personal jurisdiction
over patents argument as an excuse to not apply state sovereign immunity protections in Neochord, Covidien, or Reactive Surfaces but
it did not. Further, the fact that there was no precedent within the
federal courts for applying FMC to tribal immunity does not mean
that the Board should not apply it in such circumstance, only that
the courts had not previously considered or decided such an application. It seems instead that the Board, in an understandable effort
to comply with its ultimate mission to protect the public interest,
made its decision first and then crafted the reasoning behind it later.
2. IPR: AN ADJUDICATORY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
SUBJECT TO TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY PROTECTIONS
In the past, whether or not proceedings conducted by federal
agencies fell under the purview of sovereign immunity depended on
the nature of the administrative proceeding and its similarities to
civil litigation.102 The Court has noted some of the general similarities between the two:
[F]ederal administrative law requires that agency adjudication contain many of the same safeguards as
are available in the judicial process. The proceedings
are adversary in nature. They are conducted before a
trier of fact insulated from political influence. A
party is entitled to present his case by oral or documentary evidence, and the transcript of testimony
and exhibits together with the pleadings constitute
the exclusive record for decision. The parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of
the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the
record.103
Later, FMC was applied to a matter involving tribal sovereign
immunity when the deciding court held that “tribes are entitled to no

102

Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Port Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753–61 (2002)
(comparing Federal Maritime Commission proceedings with civil litigation).
103
Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 513 (1978) (internal citations omitted).
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less dignity than states with regard to their immunity from administrative action.”104 By this logic, if IPRs were found to be adjudicatory proceedings, then the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe’s sovereign
immunity defense would stand.
While Congress originally presented IPR as a quicker and less
expensive alternative to district court litigation, a closer look at
IPRs—similar to the reviews conducted in the aforementioned line
of Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity cases—reveals
similarities like those that prompted the Court to accept the sovereign immunity defense in FMC. Indeed, Congress specifically identified a shift from an examinational to an adjudicative model as the
justification for this alternative when it created the AIA post-grant
proceedings.105 These regulations instructed the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office to create a review process that carried
many of the same features as civil litigation, such as discovery, protective orders, the right to an oral hearing, and sanctions for abuse
of process or discovery.106 Like the pleadings in civil litigation proceedings, IPR proceedings are initiated when a person who is not
the owner of the patent files a petition for a review of the validity of
an existing patent’s claims.107 In their petition, the petitioner must
identify the real parties in interest, the claims challenged and the
grounds for challenging, along with all relevant documents required
for support of their assertions and ultimately carries the burden of
proving their assertions.108
Like civil pleadings, the petition can be met with a preliminary
response by the post-institution patent owner that sets reasons a review should not be instituted.109 This is followed by a later response
that can be filed after IPR has been instituted and addresses the
claims asserted by the petitioner and the petitioner’s accompanying
right to file a reply.110 During discovery, parties may seek a motion
for authorization (which authorizes a party to acquire a subpoena
from the district court) to compel testimony or produce documents,
104

Great Plains Lending, LLC v. Conn. Dep’t of Banking, No.
HHBCV156028096S, 2015 WL 9310700, at *4, (Conn. Super. Ct. 2015).
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157 CONG. REC. S1376 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011).
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which is subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.111 Like
subpoenas, any evidence provided during the IPR is also governed
by the Federal Rules of Evidence.112 The Director appoints a threemember panel comprised of administrative patent judges from the
PTAB to oversee the proceeding.113 Ultimately, the PTAB issues a
final decision on the patentability of any claim challenged by the
petitioner.114
Additional differences exist between an Article III proceeding
and IPR conducted by the PTAB other than those previously identified in Part I.115 As mentioned previously, IPR involves a re-assessment of the PTO’s original grant of a patent unlike the classic “suit”
to which tribal sovereign immunity is traditionally applied.116 While
an IPR proceeding’s parameters are defined by a private party, it is
up to the broad discretion of the Director of the PTO whether to
initiate the review.117 Additionally, the procedures involved in IPR
do not mirror the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No monetary or
injunctive relief is involved in the review of the patent’s claims, just
the validity of the patent itself.118 Further, to comport with the ultimate mission of a faster alternative to district court litigation, the
duration of the proceedings is limited to one year, with an additional
allowance of six months for good cause.119 Discovery is also limited
unless the parties agree to additional discovery or the PTAB grants
a motion.120 Finally, the PTO can continue to review a patent and
render a final decision in the event a petitioner is no longer a party
to the review.121
Despite IPR’s adjudicatory characteristics, the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals, in its review of the PTAB’s decision, found these
differences to be substantial enough to hold that tribal immunity did
111
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not extend to administrative agency reconsideration decisions of this
kind.122 However, this Comment respectfully disagrees with this decision and argues that the differences between an Article III proceeding and IPR do not prevent a decision maker from labeling IPR
as an adjudication in front of an administrative tribunal. As the
Fourth Circuit wrote and the Supreme Court echoed in FMC, where
the proceeding “walks, talks, and squawks very much like a lawsuit”
placing that proceeding “within the Executive Branch cannot blind
us to the fact that the proceeding is truly an adjudication.”123 In the
past, States have been shielded regardless of whether the petitioner
prayed for relief in the form of monetary damages or any other kind
of relief due to the dignity the state’s sovereign status commanded.124 Further, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals interestingly chose not to apply FMC because it found that the agency procedures in that proceeding were much closer to civil litigation than
those used in IPR,125 although the PTAB itself clearly did not share
the same sentiment when it applied the FMC framework to its prior
state immunity decisions.
Additionally, application of the tribal sovereign immunity defense comports with the Supreme Court’s use of comity as a justification for sovereign immunity and the congressional policy to promote Native American tribe’s cultural autonomy, self-actualization,
and economic self-sufficiency.126 Adjudication and invalidation of
the Restasis patents would eliminate a potential line of revenue and
societal development not just for the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, but
for all of the tribes in the United States that could follow Saint
Regis’s lead and make deals with other companies like Allergan. In
respect to legal precedent, comity, and Congress, any member of the
courts or PTAB tasked with evaluating Saint Regis’s motion should
have found that—barring other considerations—the tribal sovereign
immunity defense applies to IPR and subsequently shields a patent
owned by the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe from review.
122
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B. The Validity of the Allergan-Saint Regis Deal
While tribal sovereign immunity should apply to an IPR proceeding, an opportunity exists for a decision maker to bypass the
immunity issue entirely. This arises in the event that Allergan’s assignment of the Restasis patent rights to the Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe were deemed to be a sham. If so, the decision maker could
hold that Allergan was the true owner of the patent, dismiss the Tribe
as a party to the proceeding, and evaluate the validity of the patent
claims. Historically, parties have made attempts to affect the jurisdiction of the courts through assignments by name only.127 Kramer
v. Caribbean Mills, Inc.,128 the leading case on this kind of jurisdiction tampering, set forth a two-prong test that evaluates (1) whether
there was nominal or no consideration involved in the deal; and (2)
the interest that the assignor retained after the deal was made.129
Later cases developed factors to consider the impropriety or collusiveness of an assignment, which include the following: whether
there were good business reasons for the assignment; whether the
assignee had a prior interest in the item or instead coincided with the
litigation; what was the consideration given by the assignee;
whether the assignment was partial or complete; and was there an
admission that the motive was to affect jurisdiction.130 Using these
factors, an assignment can be rendered ineffective following a decision maker’s determination that the assignee was not the real party
in interest but “a strawman [who] had no real interest in the outcome
of the case, although a good outcome would have had some economic value.”131
Similarly, tribal immunity has been used as a tool in schemes to
avoid taxation and other kinds of government interference in the
past.132 Following those instances, judiciaries have maintained that
127
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federal Indian law does not authorize tribes to market their immunities and exemptions to businesses that normally would take their
activities elsewhere.133 As such, the validity of the Allergan-Saint
Regis transaction can be properly judged following a determination
of the “real party in interest,” which involves an examination of the
economic substance of the deal to reveal the party that would truly
be affected by any remedy.134
1. ALLERGAN WAS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
IN THE ALLERGAN-SAINT REGIS DEAL
Evaluation of whether the Allergan-Saint Regis deal was a bonafide transaction begs consideration of the “real party in interest” in
light of the Kramer sham test and its accompanying factors.135
“[T]he fact that a patent owner has retained a right to a portion of
the proceeds of the commercial exploitation of the patent . . . does
not necessarily defeat what would otherwise be a transfer of all substantial rights of the patent.”136
Allergan announced its deal to assign the rights to its Restasis
drug patents to the Saint Regis Mohawk tribe on September 8,
2017—following the start of proceedings in federal district courts
and the petition for IPR made by Mylan Pharmaceuticals.137 Previously, Saint Regis had no involvement in the development or commercialization of the drug.138 The terms of the agreement entailed
the Tribe’s grant of an exclusive license of the Restasis patents back
to Allergan to practice the patents in the United States for all uses
approved by the Food Drug Administration (“FDA”) without any
reversionary rights on behalf of the Tribe.139 The Tribe stood to receive $13.5 million up front and $15 million in annual royalty payments from Allergan for Restasis sales over the patents’ remaining
schemes); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 152–54 (1980) (marketing exemption from statewide cigarette tax).
133
Colville, 447 U.S. at 155.
134
Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1290–92 (2017).
135
Id.; see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
136
Propat Int’l Corp. v. RPost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187,1191 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
137
Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017
WL 4619790, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
138
See id.; see also Thomas, supra note 1 (“[T]he Mohawk tribe played no
role in developing the drug.”).
139
Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *3–*4.
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duration.140 Additionally, Allergan had the first right to sue for any
infringement that relates to a generic equivalent as well as the right
to grant any further sublicenses.141 The Tribe retained all of the other
rights to the patent’s practice outside of the aforementioned FDAapproved uses, including the right to use the patents for research,
education, and other non-commercial uses as well as the first right
to sue third parties in matters not related to Restasis bioequivalents.142
Despite assigning the patent rights to Saint Regis, Allergan retained complete control over the sales of the Restasis drug—a matter
of chief importance to the company.143 As part of that exclusive licensing agreement for a drug that generates sales of $1.5 billion dollars a year,144 the Tribe was slated to be paid one percent (1%) of
those earnings in royalties.145 During court proceedings, Allergan
stated that the “consideration for the assignment of the patents to the
Tribe was the Tribe’s promise not to waive its sovereign immunity
with respect to IPR or other administrative action in the PTO related
to the patents.”146 Renting immunity from the Tribe in order to continue enjoying the monopolistic protections a patent provides without having to subject said patents to reconsideration of their validity
by the PTO does not amount to a legitimate business purpose.147
The issue presented is analogous to a prior case before the California Supreme Court, where tribal entities were running a payday
loan business, and the Court observed that the formal agreements
made between the tribes and lending entities did not hide the fact
that the tribes retained no operational control over the businesses
and received only a small percentage of the ventures’ profits before
140

Id. at *1.
See id. at *4.
142
Id. at *4.
143
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144
Michael Erman & Tamara Mathias, Allergan Assuages Shareholder Fears
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holding that the tribes could not assert immunity.148 Allergan’s use
of formalities to divert attention from the transaction’s hollowness
amounted to little more than an illusion. Once someone is able to
move past the smoke and mirrors of the deal, it is easy to see that
the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe provided no real consideration in
making this deal and identify Allergan as the real party in interest.
2. LEGAL PRECEDENT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST CATERED
TOWARD INVALIDATION OF THE AGREEMENT
Transactions similar to the Allergan-Saint Regis deal have been
historically disregarded when they run contrary to the policies underlying relevant laws.149 Originally, Congress developed the patent
system as a way to spur innovation by incentivizing research and
development that would not normally occur absent some form of
protection.150 IPR was later introduced as a way to re-examine an
earlier agency decision to issue a patent that in retrospect should not
have been issued.151 By doing so, the government can better protect
the delicate balance between incentivizing development and creating monopolies that the patent process naturally created and comport with the public’s “paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies . . . are kept within legitimate scope.”152 Allergan benefited
from the patent system’s protections, made billions off of the Restasis patent, and then sought to continue doing so without honoring
the system’s limitations that were built in as safeguards.153 IPR
emerged as a threat to the existence drug companies have built as
they engaged in a system of abusive tactics aimed at manipulating
markets, suppressing the competition, and charging higher prices to
148
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149
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the public.154 The Allergan deal received so much attention because,
assuming its strategy to purchase “a legal loophole in the cloak of
tribal sovereignty”155 were successful, the company would have provided a blueprint for patent owners across all industries to undermine the entire patent system and, subsequently, the American markets.156 Prior instances like this have inspired the Court to state that
public welfare demands the PTO to not sit idly by in the face of
wrongly issued patents and deceptive tactics.157
While the federal courts have traditionally looked to congressional policies that promote the tribes and emphasized respect of
tribal sovereignty, they have also been keen to prevent the tribes’
abuse of those protections in an effort to “alter the economic reality
of a transaction . . . to reap a windfall at the public’s expense.”158
Following the decisions made in regard to tribal proliferation of payday lending and tax evasion schemes, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals made a very clear statement: tribes do not have a “legitimate interest in selling an opportunity to evade the law” to non-Indians.159 In fact, this case is very similar to Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, which went before
the Supreme Court.160 There, the Court approved Washington’s application of a statewide cigarette tax to the tribe’s on-reservation
cigarette sales to non-Indians, stating that the principles behind Native American law did not “authorize Indian tribes thus to market an
exemption from state taxation to persons who would normally do
their business elsewhere.”161 Like in Colville, although the result of
invalidation of the Allergan-Saint Regis deal eliminates the potential for tribal commerce with other companies looking to shield their
154

See Costa, supra note 24, at 184–91.
Otoe-Missouria Tribe v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Services, 769 F.3d 105,
114 (2d Cir. 2014).
156
Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *2.
157
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944)
(explaining that a wrongly issued patent does not solely concern those private
parties but “[t]he public welfare demands that the agencies of the public justice
be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud”).
158
Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1190 (2017).
159
Otoe-Missouria, 769 F.3d at 114–116.
160
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134 (1980).
161
Id. at 155.
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patents, the market for these types of assignments only existed in the
first place because of Saint Regis’s claimed exemption of immunity.162
3. WEIGHT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCORDED TO SAINT REGIS’S
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS CLAIMS AND ITS INTEREST AS AN
INDISPENSABLE PARTY
Although the FDA-approved sales of Restasis are the main part
of the patent’s worth to Allergan, that does not preclude the Tribe
from showing the substantiality of the rights they retained after
granting the exclusive-license in the Restasis patents to Allergan. If
the Tribe could show that it retained substantial rights in those patents, Saint Regis would then be a necessary party to the action and
thus, the validity of any PTAB decision made concerning the validity of the Restasis patent or Allergan-Saint Regis deal with only Allergan present would be subject to challenge.163 Aside from the royalties stemming from the exclusive license, it was argued at the
Texas district court that Saint Regis’s retained right to sue third parties not related to Restasis bioequivalents and the right to practice
the Restasis patents for research, education, and other non-commercial uses were substantial, prompting a decision by the court to join
Saint Regis as a plaintiff.164 This sentiment was not echoed by the
PTAB, which dismissed Saint Regis from the action under the reasoning that Allergan had at least an identical, if not increased, interest in defending the validity of the Restasis patent.165 This Comment
argues that decision was a mistake.
Unquestionably, tribal governments have been placed in a position where they must undertake innovative methods to generate rev-
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See id. at 157.
See Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB,
2017 WL 4619790, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
164
Id. at *4 (adopting the “safer course of joining the Tribe as a co-plaintiff,
while leaving the question of the validity of the assignment to be decided in the
IPR proceedings”).
165
Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2016-01127, Paper 130, at 37–39 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018).
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enue in order to serve their constituents and improve their communities.166 For the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, the Allergan deal
alone—and the yearly royalties it offered—provided a substantial
boost to their annual budget of $50 million.167 In addition to Allergan, the Tribe hired a firm to vet patents from other companies and
refer them to the Tribe along with recommendations for potential
business uses.168 While the Tribe planned to use those patents in infringement litigation at the federal courthouse, it also opened an Office of Technology, Research and Patents whose purpose is to encourage research and development in the fields of science and technology.169 Further, the Office hopes to foster education of Mohawk
children in the fields of science, technology, engineering and math
in an effort to create revenue, jobs, and new economic development
opportunities.170 This lends credence to the notion that the rights retained by the Tribe in the Allergan deal were not empty. The Tribe
would have had no need for the Office if its purpose was to sit idly
by and cash the Restasis royalty checks it receives from Allergan.
Instead, the Tribe viewed this line of business as a way to truly help
its people. This is primarily why—after examination and consideration of all the relevant documents—the judge at the district court
considered the question of whether Saint Regis had retained any
substantial patent rights to be a close one.171
Further, importance can also be assigned to the accepted premise
that the Tribe is an indispensable party in any proceeding that will
evaluate their contractual agreement with Allergan.172 Courts have
previously held that a “[t]ribe’s interests in its status, its sovereignty,
166

See supra Section I.C.; Ablavsky, supra note 63 (“Tribal leaders are understandably anxious to make deals that will bring much-needed jobs and money
to places that have long lacked both.”).
167
Thomas, supra note 1.
168
Id.
169
SRMT Office of Technology, Research and Patents Information, SAINT
REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, https://www.srmt-nsn.gov/_uploads/site_files/OTRAPWebsite-Blurb.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
170
Id.
171
Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017
WL 4619790, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
172
Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1975) (“No procedural principle is more deeply imbedded in the common law than that, in an
action to set aside a lease or a contract, all parties who may be affected by the
determination of the action are indispensable.”).
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its beneficial interests in real property, and its contractual interests
cannot be adjudicated without its formal presence.”173 Like the prejudiced tribe in Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, the Saint Regis Tribe had
significant property interests at stake in its rights to ownership of the
patents and subsequent royalty streams from the license agreement
with Allergan, as well as its ability as a sovereign to enter into valid
contracts.174
Further, it is unlikely that Allergan was able to adequately capture the interests of the Saint Regis Tribe in any adjudication over
the validity of the contract and the substantiality of the patent rights
the Tribe retained post-license. As a company, Allergan’s main obligations are to its shareholders. On the other hand, the Tribe is
uniquely responsible for the best interests of its Native American
citizens and furthering its economic development in order to benefit
its community. As such, the Tribe’s ability to represent itself in these
proceedings touched the congressional policy interests of cultural
autonomy, self-determination, and economic self-sufficiency.175 In
light of these considerations, it would have been reasonable for a
decision maker to come to the conclusion that the Tribe would be
prejudiced if a final judgment on the Restasis patent and the validity
of the Allergan-Saint Regis agreement was rendered without the
Tribe’s presence at an adjudication to which it consented to be a
party.
C. The PTAB Should Have Issued a Stay and
Deferred to the Federal Courts for Guidance
The PTAB chose to bypass rendering a decision on the validity
of the Allergan-Saint Regis transactions when it held both that the
Tribe was not entitled to assert its immunities at their proceedings
and that it was not an indispensable party. Instead, it arrived at that
decision by differentiating tribal sovereign immunity from that of
173
Jamul Action Comm. v. Chaudhuri, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1049 (E.D. Cal.
2016); 25 U.S.C. § 4301 (2012) (“Indian tribes retain the right to enter into contracts and agreements to trade freely.”).
174
Lomayaktewa, 520 F.2d at 1326–27 (holding that Tribe’s royalties under a
lease and the impact the lease’s cancellation would have on the community were
sufficient to support a finding of prejudice and indispensability).
175
Enter Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 890, 894 (10th
Cir. 1989) (“The Tribe’s interest [is] in its sovereign right not to have its legal
duties judicially determined without consent.”).
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the states, emphasizing the existence of their jurisdiction over patents themselves, and holding that under the deal’s terms Allergan
remained the effective owner of the Restasis patent so the proceedings could continue absent participation of the Tribe.176 However,
after consideration of the circumstances, an alternate decision to stay
proceedings at the PTO and allow the case to play out in the federal
courts was the best course of action for all of the stakeholders that
stand to be affected by this issue.
Adjudicating issues that either have potential to or affirmatively
do involve tribal sovereignty submerge the Board in an evaluative
inquiry of tribal motivations and the policies that surround the idea
of tribal economic development.177 This is an arena that requires
vastly different expertise than what is required to evaluate those patent challenges based on prior art and obviousness over which Board
members have been granted statutory jurisdiction.178 In light of this,
the potential of the Board’s decision to inappropriately affect Native
American sovereignty—a complex doctrine that has received heavy
congressional and judicial attention—and the ripple effects that decision may produce should have encouraged the PTAB to tread with
caution.179
Procedurally, the design of IPR restricts the Board’s ability to
properly decide on this issue. To start, the compressed time schedule180 and limited discovery afforded to parties181 in IPR may be efficient for review of patent validity disputes between two parties,
but this issue merits a full inquiry and discovery process that would

176

Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2016-01127, Paper 130 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018).
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See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2043 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b), 103 (2012).
179
See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959) (absent explicit authorization from Congress, decisions of “great constitutional import and effect” are
outside an administrator’s decision-making authority); see also King v. Burwell,
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (holding that the Internal Revenue Service was not
equipped to address questions that involved profound “economic and political significance” stemming from the Affordable Care Act).
180
See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100 (2018).
181
Id. § 42.51 (covering mandatory disclosures, routine discovery and production of additional documents); id. § 42.52 (discussing procedure for compelling testimony and production).
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likely stretch the time-pressed PTAB thin. Any decision on this momentous issue carries the potential of far-reaching ramifications and
therefore, anything less than a complete factual determination may
prejudice all parties involved. Additionally, the decision reached by
the PTAB on the Allergan-Saint Regis deal is not likely to be binding, given that the PTO rarely labels opinions as precedential for all
other future patent validity reviews in front of the PTAB.182 Uniform
and consistent action by the PTO in regard to tribal patent assignments and immunity defenses is required to avoid serial assertions
and challenges to sovereign immunity that themselves could undermine the patent validity review process.183
The PTAB decision on a matter of this much importance was
hasty given the fact there were actions pending in other forums that
could drastically impact both IPR and tribal sovereign immunity.
Shortly after the announcement of the Allergan-Saint Regis deal,
Senator Claire McCaskill introduced a bill that would abrogate Indian Tribes’ ability to assert a sovereign immunity defense in IPR.184
Any mention of State sovereign immunity assertions is noticeably
absent from the bill, meaning its passage is unlikely because it
would do little to eliminate the threat of assertions of sovereign immunity at the PTAB and carries with it the opportunity for Native
Americans to assert that they have been discriminated against.185
Still, the bill shows that lawmakers on Capitol Hill are cognizant of
the matter and serves as an indicator that Congress—the preeminent
authority on Indian affairs—is considering abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity.

182

Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Precedent and Process in the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, PATENTLYO (May 10, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016
/05/precedent-process-patent.html (discussing the designation of five opinions as
precedential in 2016 and the rarity of the designation since only three had been
given the label in the prior twenty-two months).
183
See Mullin, supra note 6 (describing how the Allergan-Saint Regis strategy
of transferring patents to Native American tribes could result in a reshaping of the
intellectual property landscape as patent holders would transfer their whole patent
portfolios to tribes).
184
S. 1948, 115th Cong. (2017).
185
Gene Quinn, Senator McCaskill Introduces Bill to Abrogate Native American Sovereign Immunity, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 5, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/10/05/senator-mccaskill-legislation-abrogate-native-americansovereign-immunity/id=88975/.
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Additionally, the constitutionality of the entire patent review
process was recently argued in front of the Supreme Court186 in what
became one of two landmark patent decisions issued by the Court in
2018.187 A prospective lame-duck PTAB issuing a decision on the
Allergan-Saint Regis patent rights is contrary to public interest and
carries the potential of being the final nail in PTAB’s coffin, since
any perception by the Court that the Board overstepped its authority
could tip the scales and result in PTAB’s invalidation. In 2018, Allergan initiated an infringement action in the Eastern District of
Texas against the generic drug companies. 188 At the conclusion of
the proceedings, the Court joined the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe as
a co-plaintiff but left the question as to the assignment’s validity to
be decided in the IPR proceedings where it had already been presented.189
In light of all of the aforementioned factors, the clear, best course
of action by decision makers on the Board was to stay the inter partes
proceedings and allow for the issues that precede any validity assessment of the Restasis patents to be adjudicated by the federal district court. In doing so, the PTAB would have simultaneously comported with judicial precedent190 and been released from the burden
of potentially abrogating a Tribe’s sovereign immunity absent authority. A case at the federal court level represented the best chance
to render a correct decision following an opportunity to compile a
complete factual record and develop legal reasoning that comprehend the multitude of factors at play. It also presented an opportunity
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Jeff John Roberts, The Supreme Court’s Blockbuster Patent Case: What
You Need to Know, FORTUNE (Nov. 27, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/27/supreme-court-patents/.
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Renee C. Quinn & Steve Brachmann, Supreme Court Issues Much Anticipated Oil States and SAS Decisions, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 24, 2018),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/04/24/supreme-court-issues-much-anticipated-oil-states-sas-decisions/id=96302/.
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Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017
WL 4619790, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
189
Id. at *4.
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Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 867 (2008) (“A case
may not proceed when a required-entity sovereign is not amenable to
suit. . . . [W]here sovereign immunity is asserted, and the claims of the sovereign
are not frivolous, dismissal of the action must be ordered where there is a potential
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for the courts to properly address the growing issue of overbroad
tribal immunity protections.
These decisions would establish precedent for other courts and
administrative decision makers, like the PTAB, to use when facing
this issue in the future. Indeed, the PTAB did just that when it used
the Supreme Court’s ruling in FMC to guide its subsequent decisions concerning the applicability of state sovereign immunity to its
own IPR proceedings.191 Instead, the Board eschewed these broader
implications when it made a decision that viewed the Allergan-Saint
Regis issue through the narrow scope of applicability to its own proceedings.
III. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY
TO AMEND THE DOCTRINE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
This Comment argues that the PTAB erred when it chose to
make its decision on the applicability of tribal immunity to IPR proceedings and Saint Regis’s dispensability as a party—a close call in
its own right and one that does not address the issue of tribal sovereign immunity’s overbroad protections. True, the decision was appealed and affirmed at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, but the court also chose not to address the larger tribal sovereign immunity issues in the case and restricted the scope of its
review to the Board’s decision and reasoning. 192 The Allergan-Saint
Regis deal itself—specifically, the threats it posed on the federal patent system and U.S. markets—indicates that the doctrine of tribal
immunity has grown to levels that are inconsistent with the congressional policies that underlie it.
Ideally, Congress would address this issue as Congress possesses the power to intervene and legislate over common law. Unfortunately, Congress has failed to take an official stance on the matter. As such, the responsibility for amending tribal sovereignty falls
on the Supreme Court. The federal courts’ standard for reviewing
administrative agency decisions of this kind requires the decisions
be set aside if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”193 In the past, this has
191
192

See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text.
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193
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occurred following a court’s finding that the agency failed to consider a relevant and important factor in making its decision.194 This
would seemingly provide an avenue for the Court to consider the
larger impacts that the Allergan-Saint Regis deal would potentially
have on American Indian communities and the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity as a whole, if the Court elected to do so.
As Justice Thomas detailed in his Bay Mills dissenting opinion,
the doctrine of tribal immunity was a common law creation of the
Supreme Court and the Court bears the fault for failing to properly
define the immunity’s scope.195 Until Congress does so, “it is up to
[the Supreme Court] to correct [its] errors.”196 On the basis of stare
decisis, when prior decisions have become unworkable or time has
exposed their shortcomings, the public interest demands that precedent be overruled.197 In Kiowa, the Supreme Court extended the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity to bar suits arising from tribal
commercial activities that occurred off of the tribal reservation.198
While the Court narrowly reaffirmed the Kiowa decision on the
grounds of comity, stare decisis, and deference to Congress’s plenary power over the tribes in Bay Mills, Justice Kagan left the door
open for a change when she said a special justification would be
needed to “overcome all these reasons for this Court to stand pat.”199
Allergan and Saint Regis had expressed that they were working
on a petition of certiorari to the Supreme Court for a ruling on the
matter.200 Saint Regis’s use of tribal immunity in an attempt to create
a loophole in the U.S. patent system that would pose a threat to the
U.S. economy seems to satisfy that “special justification” requirement and, if so, provided the perfect opportunity for the Court to
194
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accept the petition in order revisit the Kiowa line of cases. Instead,
the Court opted for the easy way out when it denied Allergan and
Saint Regis’s petition and affirmed the Federal Circuit’s ruling—a
move that succeeded at striking the Allergan-Saint Regis deal but
avoided ruling on the stickier issue of the scope of tribal sovereign
immunity.201
Rather than absolute immunity from suit that can only be waived
by Congress or a tribes’ explicit consent, the Court should have
amended the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity to imply a waiver
of a tribe’s immunity in commercial activities that take place off of
the reservation. This would not have changed the ultimate outcome
of the PTAB’s decision. Alternatively, while the application of the
PTAB decision is limited only to IPR proceedings, this hypothetical
solution fashioned by the Supreme Court would have created a precedent that could be uniformly applied by other courts and administrative agencies around the country.
Further, the implied waiver would have been able to comport
with the congressional policy behind tribal sovereign immunity—
encouragement of tribal cultural autonomy, self-determination, and
economic security. A slight abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity
in this fashion would not threaten the tribes’ cultural activities because it only relates to business and could actually serve to foster
tribal economic development. Additional evidence of an implied
waiver’s alignment with Congress’s intent can be found in the Indian Reorganization Act.202 There, Congress allowed tribes to bifurcate into governmental entities and corporate entities, thus creating
two distinct legal entities.203 As Thomas McLish explained, this allowed for tribal corporations to waive immunity in order to better
participate in normal business activities while still protecting the
tribal government from suit.204 McLish continued to explain that this
indicates that Congress “did not intend all commercial activity by
the tribes to be immune” and that tribal governments choosing to not
use the Act’s corporate provisions or to act independently from that
201
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tribal corporation to engage in commercial activities “should not be
immune from suits arising from their commercial dealings.”205 This
makes sense given the potential windfall a blanket immunity from
suit presents for tribes and any associated business partners such as
Saint Regis and Allergan.
A decision to imply such a waiver would have served to alleviate
any potential market inefficiencies unintentionally created as a result of the continued proliferation of Native American commercial
activity.206 An implied waiver of immunity from suit for off-reservation commercial activities would enable tribal businesses to compete effectively in today’s markets, as businesses or lenders that
were previously reluctant to commercially engage in business with
the tribes due to their sovereign immunity would no longer have to
worry.207 Today, the expansion of tribal commercial activities and
the associated disputes that have occurred as a result seem to indicate some sort of sensible tribal immunity waiver that can both serve
the best interests of the tribes and promote market efficiency.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court originally fashioned tribal sovereign immunity as federal common law with the best of intentions. As the
years have passed and the world has changed, the Court’s deference
to Congress and stare decisis have allowed the doctrine’s breadth to
grow past the sensibility of the policies that underlie it to a point
where the public interest is threatened. The PTAB was unfit to
properly review the sovereign immunity issue that the deal between
Allergan and the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe presents because, at
best, the Board’s invalidation of the deal serves as only a Band-Aid
solution. As Congress has failed to properly address the matter, the
Supreme Court should have exercised the power it possesses to
amend tribal sovereignty and imply a waiver of immunity from suit
for a tribe’s commercial activities that occur off of tribal lands. This
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would have represented an equitable solution for all stakeholders involved and thus, would have restored balance to the intellectual
property world and the public at large.

